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Differential  and variable  interest  rate pricing  strategies  are  used for  agricultural  operating
loans by the  majority of  South Dakota commercial  banks.  However,  the prevalence  does  vary
by legal  organization.  Significant differences  were found among differential interest rate pricing
structures  of independent  banks,  branch banks,  and multibank  holding company  affiliates.
Interest  rate  variability  has  increased
significantly  since  the  1970s  for  agricul-
tural  banks  and  agricultural  borrowers
[Melichar].  The  causes  and  consequences
of this  variability  have  led  to  important
developments  in the  pricing  structure  of
agricultural  loans.  Two of  these  develop-
ments  are  differential  interest  rate  loan
pricing  based  on borrower  risk and  vari-
able  interest  rate pricing  of farm operat-
ing loans.
In  this article,  we  specifically  examine
differential  and variable interest rate loan
pricing  policies  of  various  commercial
banks  in  a rural financial  market setting.
First,  the article  reviews  the loan pricing
developments of commercial  banks on ag-
ricultural operating loans.  Second,  we de-
velop  a  conceptual  framework  of  lender
differential  loan pricing behavior to assist
in  the  subsequent  empirical  analysis.
Third,  we describe  the survey  methodol-
ogy and procedures used. Fourth, we ana-
lyze the pricing policies of the alternative
types of banks, giving special emphasis to
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differential  interest rates.  Finally, the im-
plications  of  the  results  for  agricultural
lenders  and  agricultural  borrowers  are
discussed.
New  Agricultural Lending
Environment
During  October  1979,  the  Federal  Re-
serve  System  revised  monetary  policy to-
ward  controlling  monetary  aggregates
rather  than  interest  rates  in  order  to  re-
duce inflation [Stigum].  As a result, higher
real  interest  rates  and  the  international
trade effects  from  a higher exchange  val-
ue of the dollar have contributed to a  rise
in  business  risks  as  well  as  financial  risks
faced  by  agricultural  borrowers  and  ag-
ricultural lenders [Gabriel  and  Baker].
In  addition, The International  Banking
Act  of  1978,  The  Depository  Institutions
Deregulation  and  Monetary  Control  Act
of  1980,  and  the  subsequent  Depository
Institutions  Act  of  1982  significantly  re-
vised  the  regulatory  policy  environment
for all depository institutions.  Among these
changes  were  relaxation  of  interest  rate
restrictions  on  deposits and  a more favor-
able environment for multi-office banking
activity [Auerbach].
Changes in  Bank Management
Strategies
For bank managers,  the combination of
monetary  policy  and  banking  deregula-
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tion increased the uncertainties associated
with  cost  of  funds.  Agricultural  lenders
possess  a unique set of characteristics  that
have made  adjustments  to the  new  lend-
ing  environment  more  difficult  for  their
bank managers and farm borrowers.  These
characteristics  include  localized  financial
markets in economically  less  diverse rural
areas, smaller bank size, and diverse cred-
it evaluation practices for agriculture loans
[Barry  and Calvert].
As a result  of the new lending environ-
ment, asset  and liability  management  has
become a major determinant of the finan-
cial  performance  of  agricultural  banks.
Loan  pricing  and  profitability  analysis
have become more important functions in
asset and liability management [Barry and
Calvert].  Many  bank  managers  have  at-
tempted  to increase loan profitability and/
or reduce their business risk by increasing
the linkage  between  loan pricing  policies
and  cost of  funds,  cost  of loan  servicing,
and cost  of loan defaults.
Differential  and  variable  interest  rates
are  amon'g  the  agricultural  loan  pricing
strategies  increasingly  used  by  banks  to
improve the  linkage between  rates of re-
turn on loans and the cost of funds [Barry
and Calvert].  Differential interest rates are
used  by  banks  in  attempts  to  attract  or
maintain  customers  with  targeted  finan-
cial  positions  and/or  to price  loans  so  as
to equate  marginal returns  across  various
loan categories stratified by loan servicing
costs and borrower risks. Variable interest
rate loans  are  used by  banks to maintain
their gross margins or interest rate spreads
over  time  as  the  cost  of  funds  becomes
more variable.
Changes in a bank's loan pricing policy
may be aimed toward reducing  the bank's
business  risks,  but  may  also  increase  the
financial  risks  faced  by  agricultural  bor-
rowers.  The  increased  financial  risk  of
producers,  in turn, may  alter the loan de-
fault risk faced  by the banks.  This is  par-
ticularly  true  if  the  correlation  between
farm income and interest rates is expected
to be  low [LaDue  and  Leatham].  There-
fore, lenders must balance loan profitabil-
ity with the risk of loan losses [Gabriel and
Baker].
Relationship of Legal
Structure and Strategies Used
The  response  of bank  managers  to the
new  lending  environment  has  not  been
uniform  across  competing  agricultural
banks  with different organizational  struc-
tures.  All  states  place  limits  on  legal  or-
ganization and  activities allowed  in bank-
ing.  However,  states  vary  in the  level  of
restrictiveness.  Illinois,  for  example,  has
basically  restricted  banking  organization
to individual  unit  banks,  while  Iowa has
allowed multibank holding companies and
limited  branch  banking  [Barry  and  Pep-
per].  Arizona  is  primarily  regarded  as  a
branch  banking  state,  while  Colorado  is
primarily  regarded  as  a  unit  banking/
holding company state [Barkley  et al.].
Previous studies report the relationships
among  bank structure,  agricultural  bank-
ing  operations,  and  allocation  of  credit.
Barry  and  Pepper  compared  loan-to-de-
posit ratios from an independent unit bank
state  to  ratios  from  a  multibank  holding
company  state.  They  found  that  multi-
bank  affiliates  possessed  higher  loan-to-
deposit  ratios.  Barkley  et  al.  compared
loans  to  deposit  ratios  from  a  branch
banking  state to ratios from  a unit bank/
holding  company  state.  They  found  that
branch  banks  had  significantly  higher
proportions  of  loans  than  unit  banks  in
nonmetro areas but not in metro areas.  As
a  result,  they  concluded  that  banking
structure influenced the allocation of credit
in nonmetro areas.
In  a  stratified  random  sample  of  U.S.
commercial  banks,  Barry  and  Calvert
found that legal  structure  was significant
in  explaining  cost  of  funds  and  interest
margin  above cost.  They  also  found  that
a higher proportion of multibank affiliates
and  branch  banks  used  variable  interest
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rates  and  differential  interest  rates  than
did independent  unit banks.
However, the literature  has  not report-
ed  the empirical  form  of the differential
pricing structures for the alternative types
of agricultural banks.  This study is distin-
guished  from  previous  literature  because
it  provides  empirical  comparisons  of  the
differential  pricing policies  used by inde-
pendent  unit  banks,  branch  banks,  and
multibank affiliates  that are competing  in
a common  environment.
A Case  Study of Loan Pricing
The  objective  of  this article  is  to  ana-
lyze  pricing  behavior  of  South  Dakota
banks  as a  case study  of agricultural  loan
pricing  policies for banks with alternative
legal  structures.  South  Dakota  is  particu-
larly  suited  for study because  it is  one  of
the more  flexible  states  in the  legal orga-
nization  of  banking.  South  Dakota  law
permits  independent  unit  banks,  state-
wide  branch  banking,  and  multibank
holding  company  affiliates  (South Dakota
Codified  Law  51-16;  South Dakota  Codi-
fied  Law  51-20).  Therefore,  we  are  able
to make loan pricing comparisons of these
banking  structures  under  a  single  set  of
state banking regulations. Previous studies
have depended  heavily upon comparisons
among different states.
In addition,  South Dakota  is one of the
least  diversified  and  most  agriculturally
dependent states in the nation.  A majority
of the population  in the state  is  living on
farms or in small towns of less than 2,500
population.  Only  three  cities  with  more
than 25,000  population  exist  in the  state.
Therefore, comparisons  are made on com-
peting  institutions  in  a  predominantly
nonmetro market environment rather than
across heterogeneous  market regions, such
as  Illinois  or  Iowa.  Many  western  states
are similar to South Dakota in agricultural
dependency  and  population  sparsity.
Therefore,  our  study  may  have  implica-
tions for other western  states  as well.
A  Conceptual  Model
In this section, we develop a conceptual
model for assisting in the interpretation of
the empirical  analysis.  More  comprehen-
sive  and  detailed  models  representing
lender  behavior  in  determining  loan-risk
categories  and  loan-pricing  policies  are
presented  elsewhere  [Calvert  and  Barry;
Hardy  and  Moore;  Hardy  and  Weed;
LaDue et al.]. However, a simplified price
discrimination  model  can  provide  addi-
tional perspective into why differential in-
terest rate pricing schedules slope upward
relative to default risk and why rate struc-
tures differ among commercial banks with
different  forms  of legal organization.
Differential pricing models assume that
the  seller  can  identify  and  segment  the
market into distinct submarkets.  In  a dif-
ferential  loan  pricing  system,  the  lender
segments  the market on  the basis  of loan-
risk  classes.  For risk  classifications  to exist
in  a  loan portfolio,  the  lender  must have
a  method  for  classifying  the  loans  and
evaluating  the  costs  of  misclassification
errors  [Hardy  and  Weed].  Here,  we  as-
sume that lenders are able to identify dis-
tinct loan-risk  classes in terms of demand
and cost  characteristics.
Demand Characteristics  of
Risk  Classes
Presumably,  agricultural  borrowers  in
different  risk  classes  differ in the charac-
teristics  of their  demand  for  credit.  One
advantage  of  using  the  price  discrimina-
tion  model  is  that  it  allows  explicit  ex-
amination  of demand  elasticities and  the
respective  implications  on differential in-
terest rate pricing.  Previous works on for-
mal  credit  scoring,  such  as  Barth  et  al.,
have  not  explicitly  recognized  that  the
credit  demand  characteristics  can  vary
among loan-risk  categories.
Our proposition  is that the demand  for
loan funds  is more inelastic for customers
in higher loan-risk classes. Higher risk cus-
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tomers  often  lack  the  ability  to  shift  to
other lenders  or substitute other sources  of
credit  for  those  of  the  present  lender.  If
high  risk  customers  are  unable  to  obtain
debt capital at competing lenders, they ef-
fectively  become  less  interest  rate  sensi-
tive  in  their  borrowing  activities  com-
pared to customers  who can  obtain credit
elsewhere.
Second,  if  the  high  risk  customers  do
receive credit from other sources-except
for the Farmers  Home Administration and
state  credit programs-they  may  be  con-
fronted  with  higher  interest  rates  rather
than  lower  interest  rates.  A  new  lender
may  charge  higher  interest  rates  than  a
previous lender due to less familiarity  with
the  customer's  management  ability,  pre-
vious  loan  performance,  and  personal in-
tegrity.  Also, this interest  rate differential
between  known  and  unknown  customers
may  likely  increase  during  periods  when
the customer  is facing  unfavorable  indus-
try trends.
Finally,  high  risk  customers  are  not
likely  to  possess  a large  financial  cushion
of  liquid  assets  and/or  off-farm  invest-
ments.  If interest rates on debt capital be-
come  too  high  relative  to  the  return  on
off-farm  investments,  the  low  risk  cus-
tomers  may  have  flexibility  to  liquidate
assets and pay off loans. The high risk cus-
tomers do not usually have the same level
of flexibility.
As a result, interest  rate sensitivity  and
access  to alternative  sources  of debt  and
equity capital are considered to be part of
the  ceteris  paribus  assumptions  of  the
analysis  in  this  study.  Therefore,  we  as-
sume  that  each  loan-risk  class  has  a  dis-
tinct  demand  curve  for debt  capital.  We
define  the  interest  rate,  ri  charged  to  a
borrower  to be equal  to d(Li).  An inverse
relationship  is  expected  to  exist between
the interest  rate, d(L,),  and the  outstand-
ing  loan  volume,  Li,  in  the  ith  loan  risk
class.  Higher interest rates result in fewer
feasible  investment  projects  due  to inad-
equate cash  flows for  meeting the  higher
cost of capital. Therefore, producers would
be  expected  to lower  the amount  of debt
capital borrowed  as interest rates increase.
Cost Functions of Risk Classes
Each loan risk class is presumed to have
a distinct  cost  function.  The  costs  of  ser-
vicing loans and loan  losses are among the
most important  factors  affecting  the costs
of  specific  loan-risk  classes  [Hardy  and
Moore;  LaDue  et  al.].  The  costs  of  ser-
vicing loans  include customer  counseling,
clerical,  administrative,  and  bank  over-
head costs allocated to the loans.  The costs
of lender-loan  losses  for a  particular  risk
class may be associated  with the frequen-
cy  of borrower  reorganization  and  liqui-
dation. The size of loan losses  and level of
recovery  are  determined  by  factors  such
as  debt  level,  current  liquidity,  loan  loss
history,  collateral  security  position,  and
industry  trends.
The expected  default risk is incorporat-
ed into the cost structure of lending [Barth
et  al.]. Therefore,  the  lender's  risk  pref-
erence  is  partly  reflected  in  the cost esti-
mation for each risk class. The lender may
also  specify  a  bound  for  which  the  cus-
tomer default  risk is simply too high [Bal-
tensperger].  For this  analysis,  we  assume
that lenders consider only loan-risk classes
for which the default  risk is not excessive.
For  conceptual  purposes,  assume  that
the  lender  has  identified  the  number  of
economically  relevant  loan-risk  classes  to
equal  n.  Each  class  of  loans  has  a  cost
function C(Li).  Because  loans in each  risk
class  are  assumed  to  have  a  similar  cost
structure,  we  can  assume  that  the  cost
function  is  simply  a function  of  the  out-
standing loan  volume of the risk  class.
Cost of Funds
Normally,  the largest cost  to the lender
is the cost of funds. The total cost of funds
refers to  costs that the lender  pays to  de-
positors and other capital sources to secure
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funds for a specific level of lending activ-
ity.  For  a  small  rural  independent  bank
that has limited deposits, the cost of funds
typically  increases  as  the lender  attempts
to obtain additional capital to fund a larg-
er loan volume. The cost of funds may not
be as sensitive to loan volume changes for
branch  banks or  multibank  holding com-
pany affiliates.
In our simplified conceptual model,  the
lender's  total  cost  of  funds,  K(LT)  is  a
function of the total outstanding loan  vol-
ume.  The  total outstanding  loan volume,
LT equals the summation of the dollar val-
ue of outstanding  loans for all risk classes
from  i  = 1,...,n.
Conceptual Model Specification
If the bank  is a profit  maximizing  firm
[Hanweck  and  Kilcollin],  the  objective
function  (1) and first-order  conditions  (2)
can be specified in the following manner:
- =  d(L)  * Li - K(LT)-  ~  C(L,)  (1)
i=l  i=l
L  adL  Li  + d(Li)
OK(LT)  OLT  OC(Li) 0  (2) OLT  aL,  Li
for  i =  , ... , n
The marginal revenue for each risk class
(3)  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  its  de-
mand elasticity,  pi,  and interest  rate level,
d(L,).
d(L)  -(1  1)  dK(LT)  LT  o+  C(L)  (3)
17i  OLT  09Li  0Li
for i =  1,  ...  n
The  marginal  cost  of  lending  additional
funds to any risk  class  is  equal  to the ad-
ditional costs associated with the risk class
and  the  marginal  cost  of  total  loan  vol-
ume.
The interest rate  in a specific  risk  class
can  be expressed  as  a function  of the in-
terest rate of a different risk class, demand
elasticities, and the marginal costs of lend-
ing additional  funds. The first step is  set-
ting the first-order conditions  to equal the
marginal cost of total loan funds. The first-
order  conditions  for  the  kth  risk  class can
be divided by the first-order conditions  of
zth  risk  class,  where  k  does  not  equal  z.
Assume  that changes  in  the loan  volume
in  any  risk  class  will  alter  the  marginal
cost  of  total  loan  volume  in an  identical
manner. The resulting equation (4) can be
obtained for the interest rate of the kth risk
class, d(Lk).






for  k  # z
Equation  (4)  contains  a  conceptual  basis
for  examining  why  observed  differential
interest rate structures  might differ among
different  types of commercial  banks.
Conceptual Implications  for
Empirical  Analysis
Observed  differential  interest  rate
structures  will  be impacted  by the  bank-
er's perceptions  of the demand elasticities
for  the  risk  classes  and  the  bank's  cost
structure.  Lower  risk  classes  will  have
lower  interest  rates  for two  basic  reasons
that are evident  in equation  (4).
First,  assume  that  the  kth  risk  class  in
equation  (4) has a lower default risk level.
Since  loan  classes  with  lower  risk  have a
more elastic demand, we would expect the
demand elasticity  for the  kth risk  class, 7k,
to be  more elastic  than the  demand  elas-
ticity  for the  zth  risk  class,  n.  Therefore,
the ratio involving the demand elasticities
in equation  (4) will be less than one. Since
the interest rate of the zth risk class is mul-
tiplied by this ratio, the first term of equa-
tion  (4)  implies  that the  interest  rate  for
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the  kth class, d(Lk),  is lower than the inter-
est rate for the  zth class,  d(Lz).
Second,  the  marginal  cost  of servicing
low-risk  loans  is  lower  than  high-risk
classes,  so the second term in equation (4)
is  negative.  If  lenders  use  similar  proce-
dures in determining risk classes and have
similar  evaluations  of the demand elastic-
ities,  we  would  expect  that interest  rates
across  risk  classes  would  increase  at  the
same rate for independent, branch banks,
and multibank holding company affiliates.
Also, the differential interest rate struc-
ture can provide insights into whether the
cost  of  funds  is  similar  among  different
types of banks.  If  a particular  bank has  a
lower  cost  of funds,  the  differential  rate
structure  would  be  lower  than  that  for
competing banks, assuming  similarities  in
loan evaluations  and demand  elasticities.
Finally,  if the different  types  of banks
are using  different evaluation  procedures
or have  different  assumptions  on the  de-
mand  elasticities  for different  risk  classes
or  have  different  costs  of  funds,  indica-
tions will appear in the differential  inter-
est rate  structure.  If  one  group  of banks
perceives  that  the  costs  of  higher  risk
classes are greater than those of the other
groups  of banks  and/or that larger differ-
ences  in demand  elasticities  exist  for  the
risk  classes,  then steeper  slopes  would oc-
cur  for that group  of banks.  If one  group
of banks has a  lower cost  of funds and/or
a  lower  cost  in  servicing  loans  and  loan
losses,  then the overall interest rate sched-
ule would be lower for that group of banks.
Not All Banks Use Differential
Rates
Some lenders  do not differentiate  their
rates  based  on  loan  risk  classes.  These
lenders may depend more heavily on non-
interest rate terms of the loan contract  to
ration credit [Baltensperger].  Other  possi-
ble  reasons  why  a  lender  might not  use
differential  rates  may  be the  lack  of  ex-
pertise in classifying  loans, the lack of ad-
equate  cost  information,  borrower  resis-
tance  to  this  lending  practice,  or
philosophical  opposition  to  differential
rates. These lenders might  be expected  to
have  an  interest  rate  that  would  be  be-
tween the lowest  and highest  rate offered
by  the  banks  using  differential  rates.  A
lender  not  using  differential  rates  would
have the same interest rate across loan risk
classes.
Methodology  and Survey  Results
The data  for this study  were provided
by a mail survey of the commercial  bank
population  in  South  Dakota.  The  survey
questionnaires  were  addressed  to  the  se-
nior agricultural loan officer in each bank.
Bank "offices"  within the same  city limits
were  excluded  (SDCL  51-20).  Branch
banks  (SDCL  51-20)  located  in different
cities  were  included  as  were  multibank
holding  company affiliates  located in dif-
ferent  cities.
The  survey  was  sent  to  261  banks  on
November  1, 1984.  Presurvey  letters  and
postsurvey  reminder  cards  were  sent  to
strengthen  response  rates.  Of  the  total
population,  123 senior agricultural loan of-
ficers responded to the survey for a survey
response  rate  of  47.1  percent.  Although
secondary  data  sources  were  limited,  the
respondents appeared  to be representative
of the population of agricultural banks and
legal organization  alternatives in the state.
Of the total 120 banks responding, 73 (60.8
percent)  are independent  banks,  20  (16.7
percent)  are branch  banks,  and  27  (22.5
percent)  are multibank holding  company
affiliates.
The survey was designed to elicit inter-
est rate pricing data from the agricultural
lenders  and  to  determine  credit  evalua-
tion criteria, level of financial stress in the
agricultural sector,  and lender attitudes  on
extension  programs.  However,  only  the
pricing policy  results  are presented  here.
The banks were specifically asked for loan
pricing data  on  farm  operating  loans.  In
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TABLE 1.  Prevalence  of Selected  Loan Pricing Practices and Annual  Percentage  Rates  (APR)
Charged  for  Agricultural  Operating  Loans  by  South  Dakota  Independent  Banks,
Branch Banks,  and  Multibank Holding Company  Affiliates on November  1, 1984.
Used  Differential  Rates  Did Not Use  Differential  Rates
Independent  Branch  Multibank  Independent  Branch  Multibank
Attribute  Description  Banks  Banks  Affiliates  Banks  Banks  Affiliates
1. Survey Responses  42  17  24  31  3  3
2.  Use  Variable  Rate  Op-
erating  Loans  23  17  23  12  1  2
3.  Proportion of Operating  Loans With Variable  Ratesa
a. Average  80.5%  84.2%  75.9%  69.2%  80.0%  50.0%
b. St. Dev.  27.8%  26.9%  29.6%  34.4% 
b
4.  Minimum  Annual  Percentage Rate on Operating  Loans
a. Average  13.99%  13.31%  13.11%  14.33%  15.00%  13.63%
b. St. Dev.  .59  .90  .67  .53 
b
c. Range  2.80  3.00  2.00  2.00 
b b
aAverage and standard deviation  are  reported  only for those banks reporting  that they used  variable  interest
rates  for farm operating  loans.
b Insufficient  number of observations for computation  of statistic or valid comparison  with other  identified cat-
egories.  The  information  presented  for  the  branch  banks  and  multibank  affiliates  is  presented  for  reader
reference  only.
order  to  accurately  define  differential
pricing  on  operating  loans,  banks  were
specifically  asked  whether  they charge  a
different  interest  rate  for  high-risk  cus-
tomers compared to customers with a pre-
ferred  credit evaluation.
Prevalence of Differential and
Variable Rates
Sixty-nine percent  (69.2 percent)  of the
bank respondents  use differential  interest
rate  pricing  on their  agricultural  operat-
ing loans (Table 1). Sixty-five percent (65.0
percent) of the bank respondents use vari-
able  interest  rates  pricing  on  their  agri-
cultural  operating  loans.  These  attributes
are much higher than prevalences  of dif-
ferential rates  (47.0 percent)  and variable
rates  (37.6 percent)  reported  in the  1981
U.S.  survey by Barry  and Calvert.
The  survey  results  show  that  branch
banks  and  multibank  affiliates  are  more
aggressive in their use  of differential and
variable  interest  rates  than  independent
banks.  South  Dakota  branch  banks  and
multibank affiliates are similar in their use
of  variable  differential  rates.  However,
both  use  these  pricing  strategies  much
more  than independent  banks.  These  re-
sults are similar to those of Barry and Cal-
vert.
Differential rates are used by 85.0  per-
cent  of the branch banks,  88.9 percent  of
the multibank affiliates,  and  57.5 percent
of the independent  banks.  Variable inter-
est rates  are used  by  90.0  percent  of the
branch banks,  92.6  percent  of  the multi-
bank affiliates, and 47.9 percent of the in-
dependent banks.
Seventy-six  percent (75.9 percent) of the
banks that use differential pricing  also use
variable  interest  rates  on  some  of  their
farm operating  loans.  However,  the com-
bined use of variable rates and differential
rates  vary  by  legal  structure.  All  of  the
branch banks  that use differential pricing
and  all but one  of the multibank affiliates
that  use differential  pricing,  also use vari-
able interest rate pricing  on some of their
farm  operating  loans.  Only  54.8  percent
of the independent  banks that use differ-
ential  rates  also  use  variable  rate  pricing
on  some of their operating loans.
When  variable  rates are used,  they  are
not  used  universally  on  all  of the  bank's
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farm operating  loans. Independent  banks,
branch banks, and  multibank affiliates us-
ing both differential and variable rates are
not  significantly  different  in  the  propor-
tion  of  their  operating  loans  that  have
variable  rates. However,  the independent
banks not using differential rates show less
use of variable  rates than do independent
banks using both.
The  54.8  percent  of  the  independent
banks  that  use  differential  and  variable
rates responded  that 80.5  percent  of  the
operating loans have variable interest rates.
The 38.7 percent of the independent banks
that  do  not  use  differential  rates  but  do
use  variable  rates,  responded  that  69.2
percent of their operating loans have vari-
able interest rates. The results suggest that
those  bank managers who do not use  dif-
ferential  rates  are also  less apt  to  widely
use variable interest  rates.
Minimum APR Available
Further evidence that branch banks and
multibank affiliates  are more aggressive in
their interest  rate pricing  is shown  in the
survey data on minimum annual  percent-
age  rates  (APR).  In  a  question  separate
from those relating  to differential pricing,
the survey questionnaire  asked the senior
agricultural loan officers for the minimum
APR  on  farm  operating  loans  as  of  No-
vember  1, 1984.  This question  was  asked
of all banks independently  of whether they
used differential  or variable rates.  The re-
sults indicate that branch banks and  mul-
tibank  affiliates  had  significantly  lower
minimum  APRs  than independent  banks.
These results are also consistent  with Bar-
ry and Calvert.
The significant difference  in minimum
APRs is due to differences  in pricing strat-
egy  and/or  differences  in  cost  of  funds
available  in the branch  banks and multi-
bank  affiliates  compared  to  independent
banks.  Our research provides an addition-
al  perspective  on  this  issue in the  follow-
ing analysis  of interest rate  pricing struc-
ture across risk  classes.
Differential Rate Structure
For those banks  using differential rates,
additional  questions  were  asked  to  elicit
operating loan pricing data for the follow-
ing categories:  "Superior  Customer  Mini-
mum  Rate,"  "Good  Customer  Rate,"
"Average  Customer  Rate,"  "Weak  Cus-
tomer  Rate,"  and  "Inferior  Customer
Maximum  Rate."  Also  requested  was  the
percentage  of  farm  borrower-customers
associated  with  each  of  these  five  cate-
gories.
Initially, analysis of variance and  a sec-
ond-order linear model with one indepen-
dent  variable-not  reported  here-were
used  to determine  the empirical  form  of
interest rates across  risk classes  for the ob-
servations  collected  in the survey [Draper
and  Smith].  These  analyses  indicated  a
first-order  linear  relationship  between  in-
terest rates and risk classes. Therefore, only
first-order  linear  ordinary  least  squares
regression  equations  are  reported  in  this
article.
The  dependent  variable  in  the  regres-
sions  was  the  APR  reported  for the  spe-
cific  risk  class and the  independent  vari-
able was the risk class.  The coding scheme
for the risk classes was (0) for superior,  (1)
for  good,  (2)  for  average,  (3)  for  weak,
and  (4)  for  inferior.  Each  risk  class  and
associated APR  represented  a distinct ob-
servation.  Therefore,  the  number  of  ob-
servations in the regression analysis equals
the number of banks using differential in-
terest  rates  times  the  number  of  risk
classes.
Two banks  reporting  the use of  differ-
ential rates did not report their rate struc-
ture  and  are  not  included  in the  regres-
sion.  Partial  pricing  structures  were
reported  by  six  independent  banks,  two
multibank affiliates,  and no branch banks.
An interpolation  was  made  for the banks
reporting  only part of their pricing struc-
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TABLE  2.  Ordinary  Least  Squares  Regression  Analysis  of the  Relationship  Between  Risk
Class and  Annual Percentage  Rates  (APR) Charged  by South Dakota  Independent
Banks,  Branch  Banks,  and  Multibank Holding Company  Affiliates on  November  1,
1984.
Adjusted
OLS Equationsa  F-Test  Observations  R-Squared
1. Independent  Banks
APR  = 13.87 + .48  Risk Class  170.7  205  .45
(.09)  (.04)
2.  Branch  Banks
APR =  13.21  + .76  Risk Class  249.9  85  .75
(.18)  (.05)
3.  Multibank Affiliates
APR =  13.07 + .70 Risk  Class  388.4  115  .77
(.09)  (.04)
a Standard  errors of the coefficients are presented in parentheses.  The equations and coefficients are all signif-
icant  at the  P = .05  level of significance. The  coding scheme for the risk classes was (0)  for superior,  (1)  for
good, (2) for average, (3) for weak, and (4) for inferior. All  three equations  were  significantly different at the
P =  .01  level. The  significant values  at the  P =  .05  and P =  .01  levels are  2.65 and  3.83,  respectively. The
Chow test  F-statistics were as follows:  Independent  banks and  branch banks (9.77); Independent  banks and
multibank affiliates (20.35);  Branch banks  and multibank affiliates (5.28).
ture,  so  that  all  banks  analyzed  had  five
risk classes.  A separate  analysis using only
the reported  APRs did not have different
conclusions  and  only  minor  changes  in
coefficients  from  the regressions  reported
here.
The approach  used has limitations that
must be explicitly recognized.  An implicit
assumption  is  that  the  methods  used  to
classify loans into risk classes are identical
across  all  banks.  However,  it  is  obvious
that individual banks may in fact use more
or  fewer  loan  categories  than  those  de-
scribed.  A  survey  pretest  was  conducted
with local lenders to determine the appro-
priate number of  risk classes to use in the
survey.  The  pretest  found  that  five  loan
classes  were  typically  used.  The  pretest
lenders  indicated  that the question  could
be realistically  answered even  if the lend-
er used as few  as three classes or as many
as seven  classes in actual  practice.
A  second  assumption  is  that  bankers
uniformly  interpreted  the  definitions  of
the five risk  categories  as explained in the
survey.  The  combination  of  differential
rates along with the customer  distribution
data requested for each  risk  class  permit-
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ted comparisons  across  banks.  This  com-
parison indicated that general interpreta-
tions  of  risk  classes  were  similar  across
banks.  The  authors'  expectation  was  for
the superior  and inferior  risk loan  classes
to be  most  conceptually  similar  as  inter-
preted  by senior agricultural  loan  officers
across banks. Since the rate structures were
identified  as  being  linear,  the  identifica-
tion of two points strengthens the results.
Finally for regression  purposes, the dif-
ferences  between  the  risk  classes  are  as-
sumed  to be  cardinal.  This  is  done even
though the nature of the loan classification
process and survey instrument may not be
perfectly  consistent  with this assumption.
However,  we  believe  that  the  statistical
strength  of  the  relationships  identified  is
supportive  of methods  used.
Regression Results
The  regression  comparisons  among  in-
dependent banks, branch banks, and mul-
tibank affiliates  are shown in Table 2. The
multibank  affiliates  have  the  lowest  pre-
dicted  APR  for  the  Superior  Customer
class,  as  indicated  by  the  intercept  term
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Superior  Good  Average  Weak  Inferior
Loan  Risk  Class
Figure  1.  Analysis  of Regression  Results.
of the regression equations. The predicted
APR for branch banks was  14 basis points
higher  than  the  multibank  affiliates  and
the predicted APR  for independent banks
was  80  basis  points  higher than  the  mul-
tibank  affiliates.
The  branch  banks  have  the  steepest
slope  across  risk  classes.  The  predicted
APRs for the branch banks increase 76 ba-
sis  points  for  each  risk  class.  This  com-
pares to 70  basis  points  for multibank af-
filiates and 48 basis points for independent
banks.  As  a result,  the branch  banks have
the highest predicted  APR for the inferior
class.  The  inferior  customer  APR  of  the
multibank affiliates is 38 basis points lower
than for  branch  banks.  The  inferior  cus-
tomer  APR  of  independent  banks  is  46
basis points  lower than the branch banks.
The  results  also  suggest  that  branch
banks  have  the  most  discriminatory  rate
policy in that the average  differences  be-
tween  minimum  APR  for  Superior  Cus-
tomers  and  maximum  APR  for  Inferior
Customers  is 304  basis  points.  The  range
for multibank affiliates  is 280 basis points.
The range for independent banks is much
lower  at  192 basis  points.  Figure  1 shows
the results visually.
The  Chow  test  indicates that indepen-
dent banks, branch banks, and multibank
affiliates  do  have  significantly  different
(P =  0.01)  differential  rate  structures
[Kennedy]. Also it would appear from Fig-
ure  1 that the multibank  affiliates  have  a
lower  overall  rate  structure  compared  to
independent  banks or branch banks.  This
suggests that multibank affiliates are more
aggressively  pricing their  overall  level of
interest rates than are the other  banks.
Implications for Lenders and
Borrowers
A  broad  range  of bank  pricing  strate-
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South  Dakota  on  November  1,  1984.
However,  systematic  patterns  did appear
to  exist  in  the  pricing  patterns  of  banks
with different legal organization.  The pro-
portion  of  independent  banks  using  dif-
ferential  rates  and/or  variable  rates  was
lower  than  multibank  holding  company
affiliates  and branch banks.  However,  the
prevalences  for  these strategies  are  much
higher than previously reported in a  1981
U.S.  survey [Barry  and  Calvert].
The  current  differential  rate  structure
generally  would  appear to encourage  su-
perior customers to shift  to multibank  af-
filiates  and  branch  banks and,  to the  de-
gree that they are able to shift, encourage
inferior  customers  to  shift  away  from
branch  banks.  Producer  preference  for
fixed interest rates on farm operating  loans
may offset this trend because independent
banks  show  a  higher  proportion  of  their
farm operating loans with fixed rates. The
apparent  lower  overall  pricing  structure
for multibank  holding  company  affiliates
also  implies  that  the  long-run  impact  of
current pricing policies may contribute to
structural  change  in agricultural  lending
in  South Dakota.
Recent  research  has  analyzed the  rela-
tionship  between  variable  interest  rates
and the  survivability  of  the  farming  op-
eration  [LaDue  and  Zook].  In  a  comple-
mentary  fashion,  this paper  points  to  an
additional dimension of financial risk con-
fronting farm borrowers.  Although the in-
terest  rate  difference  between  the  APRs
for the lowest  and  highest  risk  class  typi-
cally ranged from 200 to 300 basis points,
observations as high as 600 basis points did
exist.  Such rate  structures have major im-
plications  for  the  marginal  cost  of  agri-
cultural  debt  capital  and the solvency  of
agricultural  producers.
As  a  result,  additional  caution  is  en-
couraged for producers as they undertake
business  and  financial  activities  that  will
alter  their  credit  risk  classifications.  If  a
producer  does  begin to  experience  a  de-
terioration  in financial  condition,  interest
rates are more  likely  to increase  in order
to compensate the lender for carrying the
additional  loan  loss  risk.  Cash  flow  diffi-
culties may likely increase, if a shift in risk
class  results in an  increase  in the borrow-
er's interest rate.
Finally, this article reveals an economic
incentive for producers to shop for credit.
Although  farm  borrowers  in  a  high-risk
class are limited in their ability to select a
new  creditor,  a  significant  portion  of
farmers still have the flexibility to shop for
credit.  The diversity  of lending practices
and  levels  of  interest  rates  implies  that
producers should search for a creditor that
offers a financial package that is most like-
ly to meet their needs. While credit shop-
ping  solely  based  on  minimum  APRs  is
not advised,  interest  rates and  risk  classi-
fication schedules are important attributes
to consider when  selecting  a lender.
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